Fred Foldvary has a
good post on Katrina, society, and the State over a
The Progress Report. There are many good insights in the short piece, but I want to highlight the following.
But how can the market and private enterprise and voluntary human action handle such a catastrophe? The answer is that the spontaneous order coordinates in three ways. One is by the price system, for commercial exchanges, as enterprises respond to profit and loss. The second is with voluntary sympathetic action, private charity. The third is with association in equality.
The error people make about free markets is to believe that it consists of millions of atomistic individuals whose actions cannot be coordinated to respond to crises other than by central planning. But historically, human beings are always, already, in community. In a free society, they form voluntary local associations: land trusts, cooperatives, civic associations, condominiums, and proprietary communities. These neighborhoods then themselves associate, forming higher-level associations, when then league together to create a higher tier all the way up to a global network. The three ways of voluntary coordination join together in harmony.
There are at least two ways to think about what is and what isn't part of the market. On the one hand, you have the Rothbardian idea that market is just the sum total of all voluntary human activity. That means hippie communes, charities, revolutionary workers collectives, and so on would count as market institutions. On a narrower conception of markets, the market is constituted by the total of commercial exchanges in a society.
When libertarians express an easy "let the market handle it" attitude, many non-libertarians will reasonably assume that this means "let for-profit commercial exchange handle it." And that might not be a very good or a very attractive idea. For instance, getting utilities out of the hands of government is a good idea, but should they be transferred to big utilities corporations (who are likely very well connected politically) or should they be turned into consumer co-ops? From a libertarian perspective these are both shifts from state to market. Indeed, as radical libertarians (left, right, or center) will be quick to point out, the consumer co-op solution is probably the
more free market solution. And yet, the consumer co-op might be considered by some to be more of a "community-based" (read: grassroots and cooperative) rather than "market-based" (read: corporate, greedy, and competitive) solution. Foldvary helps to point out that the sphere of non-coercive, voluntary social activity includes commercial exchange, but also charities and "association in equality." Hence, it seems useful to think and talk in terms of voluntary coordination, rather that (always) "the market."
Indeed another problem, especially among mainstream right libertarians, is too much emphasis on the first two and not the third. "Government welfare sucks? Leave it to private charities, they'll be more humane and more efficient!" This is probably true. But what about mutual aid societies, neighborhood assemblies, land trusts, co-ops, tenant's unions, independent labor unions, neighborhood watch and cop-watch, alternative media, community gardens, LETS systems, barter networks, mutual banks, open-source information, etc.? It may be better to be dependent on a private charity than a government bureaucracy, but what about individual and community independence through the association of equals?
Finally, one of the biggest false dichotomies in arguments of over libertarian issues (individual freedom, markets, decentralism vs. centralism) is the "atomistic individual" vs. "the community." Human beings are social? Human beings depend on one another? We are in part constituted by our relations to others and our environment? Oh, well then coerce away! I had assumed we were completely separate atoms, but now that I know we're social and relational I realize that we should be able to coerce, threaten, and control others in the name of community! What a relief!
Of course, the point--as Foldvary captures well--is not whether we're fundamentally related to others, but what
kind of relations will form the basis of our interactions. Consent or coercion? Freedom of choice or external control? Contract or status? Respect or objectification? Zero-sum or positive-sum?