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It’s the 29th, and a new edition of the Market Anarchist is now up on the blog The Freedom to Say 2 + 2 is 4. Not quite as many entries this time around, but very strong entries. Remember to submit your blog entries or videos before the 28th for the next edition. Spread the [...]

The latest Carnival of Anarchy is a discussion on the intriguing topic of education and anarchy. It starts today and will be running until August 5th. I’ll copy and paste the announcement by fellow subversive, Eugene Plawiuk, for your viewing pleasure.

Our theme for our July Carnival is Anarchism and Education.

A.S. Neill, The Modern School, Free schools, Paul Goodman, Ivan Illich, homeschooling in a statist society, homeschooling in the age of neo-conservative anti-public education, pedagogy of the oppressed, Pablo Fiere, Fransisco Fiere, Emma Goldman, the origins of American public education in Nativism and the KKK, classical education, dead white men, deconstruction, academia, autodidactic intellectuals, working class intellectuals, education and class, post secondary proletarians, William Morris, Godwin, Shelly, Byron, Keats, Mary Wollstencroft, Mary Wollsencraft Shelly, the narodniki, Bakunin, Kropotkins Appeal to the Young, the SI, France 1968, read a book.

The carnival will run July 27-August 5th.

‘I never let my schooling interfere with my education’.
Mark Twain.

I am thinking of writing a post titled Viva Le Truants! I’ll probably also do a tribute to the late but still great John Holt too.

Through Radical Libertarian.

In a follow-up comment to his pro-war Wall Street Journal article at the Volokh Conspiracy blog, “Antiwar Libertarians and the Reification of the State,” Barnett further exposes his deficiencies in thinking about libertarianism and foreign policy. The core of his argument is that “radical libertarians” can’t coherently all hold four principles he ascribes to them:

1. War is Inherently Unjust
2. Foreign Governments are Sovereign
3. The illegitimacy of the United Nations
4. The existence of fundamental human rights

One immediately smells a straw man. The trap is in 2). Here’s what he says:

[M]any radical libertarians who hold position (1) at the same time adopt a hyper-legalistic view of what constitutes a ‘war of aggression’ in which states are treated as though they were individual persons. In other words, they adopt the Westphalian view of nation states and sovereignty, which was devised to recognize and protect the autonomy of the government rulers ‘their’ territory. When making this argument, these radical libertarians treat foreign governments as ‘sovereigns’ to be respected (by the U.S. government) unless they commit or imminently threaten an act of aggression against the territory of another sovereign. Systematically violating the rights of their own subjects or citizens is a wholly internal domestic matter. In essence, these foreign governments are treated in principle as the just owners of the territories they govern. And their conduct is to be judged by the same rules of self-defense as are individuals…. One might say that, when dealing with issues of (American) foreign policy, these libertarians reify (foreign) states and treat them like individuals, with all the natural rights of individuals.

Now I’ve read a good bit of libertarian foreign-policy theory, and I don’t recall many references to the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which marked the end of the Thirty Years’ War and the Eighty Years’ War. According to Wikipedia, the two treaties comprising this event enshrined the doctrine of national sovereignty and nonintervention in the internal affairs of states. But the entry also notes that a revisionist view holds that “Neither of the treaties mention sovereignty.”

This historical controversy aside, what does it have to do with libertarianism and foreign policy? Not much. While it is true that the most substantial libertarian thinking about foreign policy embraces the principle of nonintervention in other countries’ internal affairs, libertarian noninterventionism is not founded on the principle of national sovereignty. How could it be?

Only the individual is sovereign. That being the case, no radical libertarian is guilty of reifying the state. Thus, there is no incoherence in the radical-libertarian position. Nice try, Professor Barnett, but no cigar.

If the reason for the prohibition on intervention is not national sovereignty, why have libertarian foreign-policy thinkers insisted that governments follow a strict noninterventionist principle? It shouldn’t be too difficult to discern the answer. Barnett of all people should know, given his long association with most of the heavyweight libertarian intellectuals.

Murray Rothbard, who did some of the most important work on libertarian foreign policy, summed up the answer in The Ethics of Liberty:

[T]he libertarian is interested in reducing as much as possible the area of State aggression against all private individuals, "foreign" and "domestic." The only way to do this, in international affairs, is for the people of each country to pressure their own State to confine its activities to the area which it monopolizes, and not to aggress against other State-monopolists—particularly the people ruled by other States. In short, the objective of the libertarian is to confine any existing State to as small a degree of invasion of person and property as possible. And this means the total avoidance of war. The people under each State should pressure ‘their’ respective States not to attack one another, and, if a conflict should break out, to negotiate a peace or declare a cease-fire as quickly as physically possible.

As one can readily see, no principle of national sovereignty is needed to establish the noninterventionist principle. Governments don’t have rights over “their” territories or populations. Rather, they are ubiquitous threats to life, liberty, and property. But that is precisely why they must be kept from clashing with each other—when they do, innocents get slaughtered and wealth gets confiscated. This doesn’t mean that governments may properly aggress against “their” populations unmolested. They most certainly may not. It simply means that the method of opposing a given state’s aggression must be something other than interstate warfare. A libertarian cannot coherently advocate aggression in order to fight aggression.

Once again Shag is taking the easy way out and letting other writers do most of the work. This post is quoted from the article Bad or Mad, from the British newsmagazine New Scientist, 20 March, 2004. Evolutionary psychology looks for the biological basis of complex social behaviour. The concept is, or it should be, intuitively obvious to anarchists but has been a bete noire for older generations of leftists brought up on the managerial ideology of radical environmentalism. The author contributes to our understanding that genetic determinism, particularly in the area of neurophysiology, is not some ' one gene equals one toe ' idea that popular mythology attributes to the theory of natural selection. His conclusions undercut the idea currently in vogue within the UK and spreading within the Bush administration in the United States that state intervention can make a significant impact on the level of crimes committed by sociopathic individuals. For those that are interested an introductory print and on-line subscription to NS is available here.


Whether violence is impulsive or premeditated, we want to know what makes people do it. Here science can move beyond the theological explanation of free will. Starting in the 1990s, Adrian Raine, a British psychologist at the University of Southern California, Los Angeles, pioneered the use of brain imaging to study people with antisocial personalities. His brain scans of impulsive, reactive killers show that these people have reduced activity in frontal regions of their brains, including the orbitofrontal cortex. This area sits at the head of a chain of connected brain regions, including the amygdala, hypothalamus and peri-aqueductal grey, which are activated when we are threatened. People with damage to this area often display loss of control. They are inappropriately irritable and aggressive when crossed, and they find it hard to alter their response to a situation when circumstances change and it would be in their interests to modify their behaviour. It makes sense that the brains of impulsive killers show abnormally low activity in the frontal cortex. But not all killers lack control. Raine has found that serial killers - people who commit a series of murders and evade capture, for a time at least - do not have reduced frontal activity. Their executive systems are intact and they do not lose control. So what is it that such calculating killers lack? According to James Blair, another pioneer in this field, who works at the US National Institute of Mental Health in Bethesda, Maryland, the defect lies in the amygdala, a region of the temporal lobe intimately involved in the immediate, implicit processing of emotional cues. The amygdala is activated when we detect unpleasant emotions such as fear or sadness in others, and it is involved in aversive conditioning, when we change our behaviour as a consequence of punishment. Blair and others have found that people who commit premeditated violent acts fail to detect the fear shown by others and do not learn from punishment. The amygdala also initiates the "fight or flight" response that we experience as a raised heart rate and sweating palms. And, likewise, calculating killers do not react when exposed to situations that would distress most people. What they seem to lack is empathy. When normal people are shown pictures of people's faces expressing distress, the amygdala is activated. It sends signals to the hypothalamus and other brain regions that prompt our bodies to react with the characteristic racing heartbeat and sweaty palms. Only later, when the brain's higher cortical regions are engaged, does the emotional response become conscious. Ray Dolan from the Institute of Neurology in London has found that we respond even when our attention is diverted to other matters and we see pictures of distressed faces only at the periphery of our vision. Empathy, concludes Dolan, is automatic and visceral. It is beyond our control. When we feel a wave of emotion at someone's suffering, or revulsion at the sight of their wounds, we are communing with them, whether we like it or not. But violent individuals do not react in this way. Is their lack of empathy a cause or an effect of their behaviour? Do such people start life without empathy, does it fail to develop, or do they lose it through wrongdoing? Opinions vary. Raine and others have found that children who later grow up to be violent have abnormal visceral responses such as a relative lack of palm sweating. Twin and adoption studies point to a substantial contribution of heredity to criminal, antisocial conduct, although the genetic effect is stronger for acquisitive and impulsive crime than for premeditated crimes against other people. But there is also evidence that antisocial behaviour is the result of experiences in early life. Jonathan Pincus, a neurologist from Georgetown University School of Medicine in Washington DC, has found that people accused of murder often suffered abuse as children and many exhibit neurological impairment. Undoubtedly, we have much more to learn about the neuroscience of violent and antisocial behaviour, but what we know already must surely influence our views on evil. As our scientific knowledge expands, it seems that the space for moral evil contracts. If we can find explanations for the evil people do, then are we not replacing moral evil, which is freely undertaken, with natural evil (in the words of Augustine) which is beyond our control? To the volcano and the virus might we now add the dysfunctional amygdala and the abnormal orbitofrontal cortex? In which case, perhaps violent offenders are not, ultimately, responsible for their actions and our legal system should change the way it treats them. We need to be careful. First, we should ask whether the "causes" of antisocial conduct are so prescriptive that they make violence inevitable. If the psychologically disturbed person has no choice but to commit violent acts then they may be absolved of responsibility. In that case, however, you would expect their behaviour to be rather predictable. Yet, as my colleagues Mike Hunter and Gemma Harpin at the University of Sheffield and I have pointed out, clinical evidence and experimental findings do not support this idea (Current Opinion in Psychiatry, vol 15, p 519). Indeed, a recent meta-analysis by Alec Buchanan and Morven Leese from the Institute of Psychiatry in London found that mathematical models were very poor at predicting the conduct of antisocial offenders. Then there is the problem of over-generalisation. Some commentators have suggested that the architects of the Holocaust and other genocides must have been abused as children - why else would they have committed such appalling acts? But all the available evidence contradicts this. James Waller at Whitworth College in Spokane, Washington, has trawled the literature on what he calls "extraordinary evil". He and other social scientists find perpetrators of evil who look remarkably normal in psychiatric terms. If we ascribe mitigating circumstances to all violence we risk losing sight of a truth about human nature: that the potential for evil lives within all of us. How we create ourselves Aristotle said: "Men become builders by building and lyre-players by playing the lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts." Modern thinkers agree with the idea that, in part, we create ourselves through our actions. The way the antisocial brain is configured may limit a person's choices from the outset, but, argues forensic psychiatrist Paul Mullen from Monash University in Victoria, Australia, it is by choosing evil that we seal our own fate. Mullen sees the antisocial personality as the outcome of a developmental disorder of ethical action. Someone who does not reflect upon the consequences of their actions while growing up - or who is not provided with a parent who will do so for them - creates their own antisocial destiny. If antisocial conduct is a pattern that emerges early in life, we may be able to intervene to break the cycle. Raine and his colleagues have recently published the results of ground-breaking research that suggests a way forward (American Journal of Psychiatry, vol 160, p 1627). Working on the Indian Ocean island of Mauritius, they put 83 children through an "enrichment" programme. Between the ages of 3 and 5, these children were given extra physical exercise and education and an improved diet that included milk, fruit juice, a hot meal of fish, chicken or mutton, and a salad each day. The researchers then followed them and a control group of 355 others through childhood and adolescence. They found that by the age of 23 the children in their programme were significantly less likely to have engaged in antisocial conduct on their own, at least on the basis of their self-reports and court records.
Whether convicted criminals can benefit from similar intervention is more debatable, although there is evidence that nutritional supplements may reduce antisocial conduct in prison (New Scientist, 16 November 2002, p 38). Nevertheless, much forensic psychotherapy is predicated on the notion that offenders can change. These people are not immune from feelings such as contempt for themselves and their actions, fear of being found out and pain at being rejected by their families. But changes in behaviour are hard to assess objectively, particularly while an offender is locked up and has limited scope to commit acts of violence. Many psychiatrists want to believe in the possibility of rehabilitation and redemption for violent offenders but the truth is that we really don't know whether or not treatment works. But what about the man or woman who has not yet offended, but who suffers the same neurological abnormalities as the violent criminal? Should these people also be incarcerated? Should they be removed from society and put in psychiatric "quarantine" to protect themselves and their potential victims? Advances in neuroscience make it increasingly easy to identify such people. And the notion that they might be locked away is not some futuristic Orwellian nightmare; it has already been mooted by the UK government in proposals for the new Mental Health Act. If it becomes law, psychiatrists like myself may be called upon to detain people whom we judge to be at risk of perpetrating violent crimes. That prospect is disturbing, not least because of the difficulty in predicting how much risk such individuals pose. In their recent meta-analysis, Buchanan and Leese looked at 21 studies that aimed to predict subsequent offending in anything from 53 to 3267 patients (The Lancet, vol 15, p 519). For each study, the researchers calculated two indices: sensitivity, or the ability to correctly predict future offending; and specificity, or the ability to exclude false positives. Values varied considerably, but the mean for all the studies was 0.52 for sensitivity and 0.68 for specificity. A sensitivity of 0.52 means that for every 10 people with personality disorder who went on to reoffend, five would be identified and detained and five would be missed. A specificity of 0.68 means that for every 10 people who did not go on to more crimes, seven would be identified and released and three would be detained unnecessarily. Buchanan and Leese concluded that to prevent one violent act over a year, six potential perpetrators would need to be detained for the duration. As well as infringing the liberty of innocent people, this would clearly be a waste of public resources. And far from keeping potential killers off the street, the introduction of psychiatric quarantine would demonise the innocent and probably deter those who suffer from neurological abnormalities from seeking medical help. It is difficult not to conclude that although neuroscience gives us a greater insight into the minds of killers, it only complicates the decisions we must make when dealing with the evil that humans do. Faced with questions of culpability, violence and victimhood, our moral sense works rather like our visual system observing the illusion of the Necker cube. When first we look we see one form, but as we stare for longer it reverses: the corner that was towards us now recedes into the plane. Similarly, when we see the perpetrator of a violent act we see a villain - until we know their story. Then a victim may emerge, and it becomes easier to minimise their crime.

In short evil deeds are a combination of predisposition and habit, they have nothing to do with ideologically based concepts, or should we say fads, like "mental illness". Emotional problems are the result of the circumstances of our lives. It is not a question of nature versus nuture but a combination of both. Check here for more references on sociopathic behaviour.

[cross-posted at Liberty & Power]

I’ve been interested in Aaron Burr revisionism for a while. Burr had the bad luck to make enemies of both Jefferson and Hamilton, thus earning the ire of historians across the political spectrum; but I’ve long suspected that Burr, like Jefferson and Hamilton, was a complicated mix of good and bad and not the plaster villain he’s been cast as. (Besides, a man who wears a locket of Mary Wollstonecraft can’t be all bad!)

I just saw a C-Span talk by Nancy Isenberg on her Burr-revisionist book Fallen Founder. The book sounded interesting, and less blindly adulatory of Burr than, say, Roger Kennedy’s book. (Kennedy’s Burr, an uncompromising abolitionist hero trying to carve out a territorial enclave of racial and sexual equality, always seemed a bit too good to be true.)

Unfortunately, I was put off by the fact that Isenberg said several things that seemed to me historically dubious:

1. Isenberg said that Hamilton wrote ahead of time that he planned to fire into the air during his duel with Burr. No; he wrote ahead of time that he planned not to fire at all. (Or at least he said that he planned to “reserve and throw away” his shot. “Throw away” is ambiguous, I suppose, between firing into the air and not firing, but “reserve” seems to favour the latter.)

2. She said that James Monroe’s military interventionism was at odds with the anti-interventionism of his own Monroe Doctrine. No; the Monroe Doctrine was not anti-interventionist – quite the contrary.

3. She said that Hamilton was a slaveowner. Maybe; but although Hamilton was complicit in slavery in various ways, as far as I know his actually owning slaves hasn’t been proven. (He had black servants, but I don’t believe it’s ever been determined whether they were free or slave. Of course, I haven’t read her book; perhaps she proves this?)

I’ve begun placing Benjamin Tucker’s Instead of a Book online in HTML format. So far I’ve got the Preface, Part I, ten chapters from Part II, eleven chapters from Part III, three chapters from Part IV, and one chapter from Part VIII. More to follow!

But next up: the Bastiat-Proudhon debate!

The issue of abortion is one of those hotly debated topics that are only solved, one way or another, by massive social movements. I hold no delusion of being able to solve this issue in one blog entry, even if I wanted to. However, what I can do is point out in what way abortion [...]

I’m slowly getting around to catching up on my reading…

1. The entire run of Benjamin Tucker’s Liberty is online thanks to the irrepressible Shawn Wilbur. Grab it here. Thanks to Roderick Long for the mention.
2. So that you don’t have to click on each file and start an individual download, you may be interested in HTTrack Website Copier, an open source application I use to locally store web sites when I might be needing them when I don’t have internet access.
3. Kingdom of Loathing! The zany web-based sort-of-RPG that mocks all other RPGs. Those without an offbeat sense of humor need not apply. An adventurer is you! My name: “Tolman” (sans quotes)

Because even when you play by their rules and go to the State with your hat in your hand pleading "Please kind sir, might I be permitted to use this incredibly benign substance - under very special circumstances you understand - so that I might escape for a few hours the extreme agony of illness?" you're putting yourself in their hands, and they're more than likely going to do something like this.